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I drive a little too fast when coming home from work. As I am 
about to drive through a particularly tight curve, often an image 
comes before my mind's eye of a bicyclist just beyond the bend. To 
avoid the possibility of a collision, I slow down. Other times, as I am 
looking in my rear view mirror, an image of a police car's flashing 
blue lights comes to mind. This image immediately causes me to take 
my foot off the gas to avoid the possibility of a speeding ticket. Here 
are two everyday examples of my using conceivability as a guide to 
possibility. Because I assume that these images provide me with a 
guide to possibility, I decelerate. But why think conceivability can 
provide me with such a guide? That is, why think that my conceiving 
of a certain state of affairs shows (or even provides prima facie evi-
dence) that that state of affairs is possible?'1 
This question has gotten much attention lately. But those who 
are seeking its answer are often doing so in the service of some 
larger cause. As a consequence, they define conceivability quite nar-
1 Some might argue that in these examples I am not using conceivability as 
a guide to possibility, rather I am using conceivability as a guide to probability. 
I decelerate not because it is possible that there is a police car tailing me, I 
decelerate because there is the real chance that a police car is behind me and 
these images are just reminding me of this fact. But when we are dealing with 
such everyday possibilities the possible and the probable blend together. That 
is, when we wonder what could happen to us in the near future, whatever we 
deem possible, we often can't help but consider probable. Moreover, prior to 
our determining that an event is probable, we must first establish that that 
event is possible. In what follows, I want to show how the images we call forth 
can help us in this task. 
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rowly. Consider, for example, the debate within the philosophy of 
mind between David Chalmers and Frank Jackson on one hand and 
Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker on the other.2 The question at issue 
here is whether physicalism requires the a priori deductibility of men-
tal facts from physical facts. In terms of this debate, conceivability is 
then defined negatively: p A ~ q is conceivable just in case q cannot be 
deduced from p using logical and conceptual truths. 3 Regardless of 
the outcome of this debate, nothing here will tell me if or how my 
ability to call forth images of flashing blue lights justifies my belief 
that it is possible that a police car is behind me. 
This is because this notion of conceivability doesn't include a sen-
sory component. In fact, most of the recent literature on the relation-
ship between conceivability and possibility has largely ignored the role 
the sensory imagination can play within a modal epistemology. Both 
Chalmers and Ernest Sosa, for example, consider the ability to imag-
ine as one of the methods by which we can conceive of a proposition.4 
Sosa even makes the further claim that the imagination may "perhaps 
provide a distinctive source of justification," but he does not support 
this claim with an argument 5 And Chalmers forgoes a sustained dis-
cussion of the question as to whether the imagination provides us with 
a guide to possibility by noting that conceivability outstrips our ability 
to call forth mental images. But, in the above examples, it would seem 
that it is at least in part my ability to call forth images of a bicyclist and 
2 See Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker, "Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and 
the Explanatory Gap," The Philosophical Review 108 ( 1 9 9 9 ) : 1-46. See also David 
Chalmers and Frank Jackson, "Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explana-
tion," The Philosophical Review 110 (2001) : 315-361. 
3 This is the second of Block and Stalnaker's two notions of conceivability. 
The first is less explicit but even more narrow, explained entirely in terms of 
natural kind terms like 'water* and their reference on Twin Earth. See Block 
and Stalnaker ( 1 9 9 9 ) : 6-7. Katalin Balog also gives an equivalent formulation 
in her article "Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem," The 
Philosophical Review 108 ( 1 9 9 9 ) : 498 . 
4 See Ernst Sosa, "Modal and Other A Priori Epistemology: How Can We 
Know What Is Possible and What's Impossible?" The Southern Journal of Philoso-
phy (Vol. X X X V I I I , Suppl. 2 0 0 0 ) ; and David Chalmers, "Does Conceivability 
Entail Possibility?" Conceivability and Possibility, edited by Tamar Szabo Gendler 
and John Hawthorne, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 2 ) : 145-200. 
5 Sosa ( 2 0 0 0 ) : 2. 
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police lights that justifies my belief that I should slow down. Thus, I 
want to develop a modal epistemology that depends on the imagina-
tion. Doing so will provide us with a much needed account of our 
everyday uses of conceivability as guide to possibility. 
Unfortunately, any modal epistemology that depends on the 
imagination will suffer from the problem of indeterminacy. In most 
cases, when we imagine proposition (p) whatever image we call forth 
will be indeterminate and this indeterminacy will preclude us from 
concluding that we have conceived of what we intended to conceive, 
viz., p. Consequently, we can't draw any conclusion about p's modal 
status from the images we have called forth. Thus, conceivability 
here can't provided us with a guide to possibility. 
In response, I will argue that if we allow inferences to our best 
explanation to play virtually the same role in justifying our modal 
claims as they play in justifying our claims about what is actual, in cer-
tain cases we will be able to meet this objection and we will also be able 
to explain how conceivability can provide us with a guide to possibility. 
But this response courts another common objection; the problem of 
incompleteness. Because of our limited mental capabilities, we can't 
conceive of everything that pertains to p. Thus, whatever we conceive 
will always be incomplete. Consequently, we can't be sure that a con-
tradiction or incoherence wouldn't be revealed if we had conceived 
of this proposition completely. Thus, again, we can't draw any conclu-
sions about what is possible based on what we have conceived. 
Clearly, the problems of indeterminacy and incompleteness are 
my Scylla and Charybdis. Thus I begin the paper by discussing each 
of these objections in detail. I will then offer a solution to the prob-
lem of indeterminacy that employs inferences to our best explana-
tion. I will next explain how conceivability can provide us with a 
guide to the modal status of some propositions. Finally, after consid-
ering some counterexamples to my theory, I will offer a response to 
the problem of incompleteness.6 
6 A note is in order about the notion of possibility at play in this paper. As 
Gendler and Hawthorne point out, conceivability is most often taken to be 
a guide to what they call 'metaphysical possibility,' which concerns the "ways 
things might have been." Thus, to say that p is possible is just to say that there 
is a possible world in which p is true. And each possible world is described or 
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Objection One: Indeterminate Images 
As I have said, the indeterminacy objection arises when, in order 
to provide ourselves with a guide to p's modal status, we conceive 
of p via our imagination. It is commonly thought that to imagine p, 
one must call forth an image or a series of images of some state of 
affairs in which p is true. So, to imagine myself doing yoga, I might 
call forth images of myself assuming the down-dog position and then 
the crouching-tiger-hidden-dragon position. Now, via this method, it 
seems we can conceive of the impossible. For example, we can seem-
ingly imagine a table whose top is both circular and square by calling 
forth an image of such a table viewed from its side.7 But if we can 
imagine the impossible, then this method of conceiving can't provide 
us with a guide to possibility. 
One way to undermine this argument is to challenge the above 
example with the hope of showing that it isn't in fact an instance of 
our imagining the impossible. Consider then the image we call forth 
when we try to imagine this table. Because we are picturing this 
table from its side, the tabletop in this image will be depicted by not 
much more than a straight line. Clearly, this image is indeterminate. 
It is just as much an image of a round-square table as it is an image of 
a table with a triangular or rectangular top. Consequently, we can't 
conclude that we have imagined a round-square table here. And if we 
can't conclude this, then, obviously, we can't conclude that we have 
imagined the impossible. 
The problem with this counter-argument is that it sinks the ship 
it is trying to save. While indeterminacy does affect this image, it also 
affects all of the images we can ever call forth of a particular object, 
person, or substance. I am currently sitting at my desk, starring out 
the window into my backyard. Say that I try to imagine the following 
proposition 
(F) My father is mowing my lawn. 
constituted by a complete and consistent set of propositions. In what follows, 
it is this wide sense of possibility that is intended. Tamar Szabo Gendler and 
John Hawthorne, "Introduction," Conceivability and Possibility, (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 2 0 0 2 ) : 5. 
7 Paul Tidman offers a version of this example. See Tidman, "Conceivability 
as a Test for Possibility," American Philosophical Quarterly 31 ( 1 9 9 4 ) : 300 . 
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And I call forth a series of particularly forceful and vivacious images 
of a man that looks like my father sitting on a John Deere cutting my 
grass. Can I conclude that I have imagined F? Given the standards 
implied above, I can't. These images are also indeterminate. They 
could be images of my father, but they could just as well be images of 
my Uncle Bill who looks an awful lot like my father. Nothing about 
these images in and of themselves precludes this interpretation. 
Thus, I can't conclude that I have imagined F. 8 
When imagining p, in most every case there will be some sort 
of similar indeterminacy associated with the images we have called 
forth. Such indeterminacy will give us reason to question whether 
8 Some have argued that this objection can be solved by noting how causal 
facts can determine the content of an image. Rembrandt's self portrait, for 
example, is clearly of Rembrandt because he was painting himself when paint-
ing this portrait. But consider the case of my uncle and my father. As I noted 
above, the two look very much alike, so much so that when considering family 
photos I at times can't tell if the picture in hand is of my father or of my uncle. 
Now, I have all sorts of images of my family stored in my head. Let's say that I 
am asked to imagine my dad and I call forth an image and it is an image that 
looks like my dad, but also like my uncle. I don't know why this image came 
up as opposed to another. I also don't know if I stored this image correctly 
under the "father" file in my mind's file cabinet. Worse yet, 1 don't know if this 
is a composite picture or a memory. If it is a composite, if I in some way con-
structed this picture, I don't know how and what images I used as parts. The 
point here is that I don't know much about the causal process that produced 
this (or any) image and because I don't have this information I don't know how 
causal facts can help me determine the content of an image. 
To this, some might reply that these aren't the causal facts at issue. Rather, 
it is my knowledge of my own intentions and in addition, the knowledge I have 
about my own experiences that determine the content of my imagined images. 
I discuss the role intentions can play in determining the content of one's imagi-
nation in footnote 18. As to the information I have about my own past experi-
ences, it seems as if the process by which such information would determine 
the content of an imagined images would be similar to the process I describe 
in my own solution to the problem of indeterminacy, viz., a process involving 
inferences to the best explanation. (See the section entitled "Indeterminacy 
and Inferences to the Best Explanation.") Thus, either I don't have the causal 
information I need to determine the content of my imagined images, which 
leaves the problem of indeterminacy unaddressed, or I do have it, and it is this 
very information I employ to address the problem of indeterminacy when I 
account for an image via my best explanation. 
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these images are really of a state of affairs in which p is true. And, 
of course, if we are trying to imagine p for the purpose of providing 
ourselves with a guide to possibility and yet we can't tell whether 
we have imagined p, we surely can't draw any conclusions about p's 
modal status based on what we have imagined. Thus, for this reason, 
our imagination can't provide us with a guide to possibility.9 
Objection Two: Incomplete Stories 
The problem of incompleteness, like the problem of indeter-
minacy, primarily arises in response to our employing a specific 
method of conceiving as our guide to possibility. But in this instance 
the method of conceiving at issue isn't our ability to imagine; rather, 
it is our ability to tell stories. Now, while my modal epistemology 
does depend on our sensory imagination, story telling will also be 
relevant. This means my epistemology will also have to address this 
objection. So let's also begin this section by considering the specifics 
of this method of conceiving and then turn to this objection. 
To conceive of p via this method, one must tell a story or describe 
some state of affairs in which p is true. Minimally, this story is to 
describe some of the conditions associated with p's truth. So, for 
example, to imagine that my brother married his Bulgarian sweet-
heart in a shotgun ceremony, I must tell a story either about how he 
came to marry this woman, what the wedding was like, and/or what 
happened to Richard and Svetlana after their nuptials. 
To say that p is possible is to say that there is a possible world 
in which p is true, where that possible world is understood to be 
described or constituted by a maximally consistent set of proposi-
tions which contains p. Given this, if we could tell a story in which 
we described all the conditions necessary for p's truth, then we could 
come to a conclusion about p's modal status from what we had con-
9 The indeterminacy objection is discussed by James van Cleve, "Conceiv-
ability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 
64 ( 1 9 8 3 ) : 36 ; Tidman (1994) : 298-301; Christopher Peacocke, "Imagination, 
Experience, and Possibility: A Berkeleian View Defended," Essays on Berkeley, 
edited by J. Foster and H. Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985) : 
19-35, and Stephen Yablo, "Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility," Philosophy 
and Phenomenological Research, vol. LIII, no. 1 (1993) : 27-30. 
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ceived. For if in telling such a story we encountered no contradic-
tions, for all intents and purposes we would have described a pos-
sible world in which p was true. Thus, given the above definition, we 
would have established that p is possible. 
But the problem here is clear. We can't describe all the condi-
tions that are necessary for p's truth. For such a set of proposi-
tions is infinitely large. We can describe some of these conditions. 
But such a description is an inadequate basis from which to draw 
conclusions about p's modal status. For this shortened descrip-
tion might hide some contradiction or incoherence that would 
have been revealed if this description had been completed. And, of 
course, such a discovery would force us to conclude that the world 
we were describing wasn't in fact a possible world. Thus, no con-
clusions can be drawn about p's modal status from this shortened 
description. 
Take, for example, the proposition 
(T) Yesterday I traveled back in time. 
I can tell a story about how yesterday morning I blasted off in a 
special spaceship whose maximum speed exceeded the speed of 
light, how I then decided to fly to 79 AD in order to witness the 
destruction of Pompeii, how I eventually tired of the spectacle, and 
thus headed for home, returning in time for dinner. But this story 
clearly falls short of a complete description of a possible world. 
Hence, I can't conclude that T is possible. For if I extended this 
story to include more of the consequences of T's truth, I would 
discover a host of contradictions. I would discover that I could 
prevent myself from ever existing, that future events caused past 
events, and that time no longer worked as it was supposed to work. 
Thus, I can't base my conclusion that T is possible on this short-
ened story. 
So any story we tell will always be incomplete. It will never con-
tain all of the conditions associated with p's truth. Hence, a con-
tradiction or incoherence may remain hidden that would reveal the 
proposition in question to be impossible. Thus, we can't conclude 
that p is possible given the stories we tell about p. 1 0 
, 0 T h e problem of incompleteness is discussed by Tidman ( 1 9 9 4 ) : 303-305 . 
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Proof vs. Justification 
Unfortunately, both the problem of indeterminacy and the prob-
lem of incompleteness are unsolvable. To quickly review: if we are 
conjuring up images of p where p concerns a specific object, person, 
or substance, the images we call forth will always be indeterminate. 
If instead we try to conceive of p via a story, that story will never 
constitute a complete description of a possible world. Thus, given 
these problems, we must conclude that our ability to conceive of p 
via these two methods doesn't provide us with proof that p is possible. 
Note though that one of my goals for this paper is to defend the 
claim that conceivability provides us with a guide to possibility. For 
conceivability to function as a guide, it need not provide us with 
proof If instead it merely enabled us to justify our beliefs in regards to 
what is possible, that in itself would constitute a guide. Thus, we will 
now move away from notions of proof to the less stringent notion 
of justification.11 Of course, making this move won't, by itself, solve 
either of our two objections. Rather these objections get moved as 
well. That is, the questions now before us are 1.) How and why do 
the images I call forth justify my belief that p is possible, despite the 
fact that these images are indeterminate? And 2.) How and why does 
the story I tell justify my belief that p is possible, despite the fact that 
p might imply a contradiction not uncovered by my story?To answer 
these questions, we need to consider how we deal with indetermi-
nacy when it arises in other contexts. If we do this, we will see how 
our two objections can both be addressed and how conceivability 
can in some cases provide us with a guide to possibility. 
Indeterminacy and Inferences to the Best Explanation 
The problems associated with indeterminacy don't just arise 
when we try to justify our beliefs about what is possible. They also 
arise when we form beliefs based on our perceptions. Over Winter 
Break, I went to Washington to visit my brother. As I walked through 
"Justification is defeasible. Thus, via my modal epistemology I might be 
justified in believing that p is possible, when it isn't. Such failures don't neces-
sarily indicate that my theory is flawed; rather, they are a consequence of the 
move from proof to justification. 
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the airport, I spied a man some ways away who looked an awful lot 
like my father. As far as I knew, my father wasn't going to be in the 
Capitol. But my uncle was, for he lives near and works in Washing-
ton. Despite this, I contend that I was justified in believing that it 
was my father I was seeing. Why was this? Why didn't my beliefs 
about my uncle (in combination with the fact that he resembles my 
father) undermine my justification that it was my father standing at 
the gate to Concourse C? 
My belief here wasn't undermined because I have an account 
of my relationships with the different members of my family and 
it is this account that in part justifies my taking these perceptions 
to be of my father. I know that my father is the kind of man who 
would hop on a plane bound for Washington to surprise his children. 
I also know that my uncle wouldn't ever feel the need to meet me at 
the airport. For these reasons, I was justified in believing that it was 
my father waiting for me, as opposed to my uncle. , 2Problems with 
indeterminacy arise at virtually every moment of our waking lives. 
It appears to me as if there are trees outside my window but these 
perceptions could equally well be perceptions of plastic fakes. Noth-
ing in these perceptions themselves can tell me which is the case. But 
even though such problems are omnipresent, we can in some cases 
1 2 1 am arguing that my belief that it was my father standing at the gates to 
Concourse C and not my uncle was justified via an inference to my best expla-
nation. But, some might argue, the person at Concourse C was most likely a 
complete stranger, who just resembled my kin. Given this, how then was I justi-
fied in believing that it was my father as opposed to a stranger? 
In response to this objection, note that justification comes in degrees. Thus, 
depending upon what laws and relationships compose my best explanation, I 
might be forced to concede that I would have been more justified in believing 
that it was a complete stranger than in believeing that it was my father. But this 
concession doesn't prevent me from arguing that given that same best explana-
tion I was more justified in believing that it was my father than in believing that 
it was my uncle. O f course, I don't want to make any such concession. The best 
explanation I have of the fact that two or more people resemble each other in 
multiple ways is that the people in question are related. Thus, because this man 
at the gates to Concourse C looked an awful lot like me, I was more justified 
in believing that he was a relation than a stranger. And then for various reasons 
detailed above I was more justified in believing that he was my father than my 
uncle. (See footnotes 16, 18, and below.) I would like to thank the referee for 
this journal for bring this objection to my attention. 
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swiftly and easily move around them via inferences to our best expla-
nation. Each of us has an explanation of how this world works. And it 
is via this explanation that we justify many of our beliefs and at times 
ameliorate the indeterminacy of our perceptions. While my images' 3 
of the things outside the window are, considered in themselves, inde-
terminate between real and plastic trees, my best explanation justi-
fies my belief that they represent real trees. 1 4 
So, when justifying our beliefs about the actual world, inferences 
to our best explanation enable us to negotiate problems of indeter-
minacy (among other things). Might these same kinds of inferences 
help us with the indeterminacies that arise when we seek to justify 
our beliefs about what is possible? I contend that they do. 
Return to the example of my trying to imagine a round-square 
table in which an image of a table viewed from the side comes before 
my mind's eye. Say this image came to me and yet I didn't know its 
origins. In other words, say that while this image was quite forceful 
and vivacious,15 I didn't know whether I had imagined it: whether 
it was a veridical perception, or whether it was an optical anomaly. 
Under these circumstances, would I be justified given my best expla-
nation in concluding that this image was a veridical perception of a 
1 3 At times I use the word 'image' broadly to refer to those sensory experi-
ences that can be produced via multiple means, i.e. via the imagination, per-
ception, optical anomalies, and hallucination. At other times, I use the word 
'image' to refer more narrowly to an image produced specifically through the 
imagination. I have specified which sense I mean only when context does not 
suffice. 
1 4 In an earlier paper, I explore both the role inferences to the best explana-
tion play in perception and the relationship between the imagination and per-
ception. There I highlight the minimal nature of the claim being made above. I 
am only claiming that such inferences are one of the tools we employ to address 
issues of content when perceiving. I also emphasize that such inferences are 
only made explicit when challenged or when we discover that the belief at 
issue, while justified, is in fact false. In the present paper, I again discuss these 
inferences and this relationship, though briefly. See Rebecca Hanrahan, "Imag-
ination and Possibility," Philosophical Forum, vol. X X X V I I I , no. 2, Summer 2007. 
151 hold that sensory mental states such as imagined images and percepts 
have qualities that vary in degrees. What qualities these are and how they are 
best described is not important to my theory. Above I work with the notions of 
force and vivacity for the sake of convenience and tradition. 
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round-square table? No, I wouldn't. Given what I know of tables and 
shapes, I know that I can't draw any conclusions about the shape of 
this table when seeing it from its side. Thus, not only can't I conclude 
that this is a round-square table, I can't conclude that this table is 
triangular, circular, or square. In this case, my best explanation pre-
cludes me from concluding that I have imagined what I intended to 
imagine. 
But what of the images I call forth when I try to imagine my 
father mowing the lawn? What does my best explanation tell me 
about these images, which were also quite forceful and vivacious? 
If these images had come to me and again I didn't know their ori-
gins, then given my best explanation I would be justified in taking 
these images to be veridical perceptions of my father. In fact, my best 
explanation would demand that I draw this conclusion, for if I took 
these images to be of my uncle, the account I would have of them 
would be too complicated. After all, my father lives down the street 
from me, and he nags me constantly about my failure to maintain my 
house's 'curb appeal.' I can easily tell a story about him getting fed up 
with my laziness and mowing my lawn for the sake of the neighbor-
hood. In addition, my uncle lives near DC and cares not for machines 
or lawn care. Thus, I would have to tell a convoluted story to get him 
on my mower.1 6 
Thus, we have an in principle way of dealing with some of the 
indeterminate images we call forth. Say I want to justify my belief 
that p is possible and I call forth a series of images. I can ask of these 
images the following question: If the origin of these images were 
unknown to me, could I (given my best explanation) justify taking 
1 6 T h e fact that I can within the confines of my best explanation tell a con-
voluted story that would have it be my uncle on the John Deere Mower as 
opposed to my father means that I would be justified in taking these images to 
be of my uncle. But in so far as this story is convoluted as compared to the story 
I can tell about my father means that I am less justified in taking these images 
to be of my uncle and more justified in taking these images to be of my father. 
And, of course, abduction like any other justificatory inference demands that 
I seek to provide myself with the best justification I can, unless there is good 
reason to settle for less. And there is no such reason here. Hence , abduction 
demands that I take these images to be of my father. See as well footnote 12, 
18, and below. 
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these images to be veridical perceptions of p? If I could, then regard-
less of the fact that these images are indeterminate, I would be justi-
fied in concluding that I had imagined p. 
What I have done above is place a requirement on the imagina-
tion when seeking to justify our belief that p is possible. Specifically, 
the images we call forth must be such that given our best explana-
tion these images could be taken to be veridical perceptions of p (if 
their origins were unknown). It shouldn't be surprising that such a 
specific requirement is in place here. Often when we seek to justify 
a particular kind of belief, there are requirements to be met that are 
more stringent than those in place in different contexts. (To justify 
many of our scientific beliefs, for example, our observations must be 
made in controlled settings.) It also shouldn't be surprising that this 
is the requirement we must meet. It has been said that the imagina-
tion is to the possible as perception is to the actual.1 7 If this analogy 
is illuminating, then the same requirements placed on us when we 
employ our perceptions to justify our beliefs about the actual world 
might be operative when we employ our imagination as a guide to 
possible worlds. Obviously, inferences to our best explanation have 
a role in justifying our beliefs about the actual world and, as I will 
show, such inferences can play a similar role when justifying our 
beliefs about possible worlds. 1 8 
1 7 See Peacocke ( 1 9 8 5 ) : 31; Yablo ( 1 9 9 3 ) : 5; and W. D. Hart, The Engines of 
the Soul, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) : 15. 
1 8 Might there be a simpler way to address this problem of indeterminacy? 
In "Conceivability as a Test for Possibility," Paul Tidman contends that though 
imagined images are indeterminate, this indeterminacy is irrelevant, for it is 
our intentions that determine the content of our imagination. 
But consider that the imagination is contentful. When we imagine, we 
always imagine something, a person, place, or thing, for instance. Next consider 
that to imagine anything, we must call forth images. If Tidman is right, these 
images won't do any work in determining the content of what we have imagined. 
Say I intend to imagine the rebuilding of the Berlin Wall and the images that 
come before my mind's eye resemble a tomato. In this situation, despite what 
my images seem to be images of, viz., a tomato, I will have successfully imagined 
the rebuilding of this wall. But this seems wrong. If imagining is a contentful 
activity that essentially involves the calling forth of images, these images must 
have some role in determining the imagination's content. O f course, this conclu-
sion doesn't preclude our intentions playing some role in determining this con-
tent; my claim so far is only that they do not by themselves determine content. 
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An objection, though, arises at this point. I am trying to negoti-
ate a way around the problem of indeterminacy. And I argue that I 
can avoid this problem if the images I have called forth are such that I 
would take them to be veridical perceptions if these images had come 
to me in such a way that I didn't know their origin. But since I assumed 
that these images possessed high degrees of force and vivacity, it is 
no surprise that I would take these images to be veridical. For high 
degrees of these very qualities is what marks an image as veridical. 
Thus, in making this assumption, it seems I have begged the question. 
In response to this objection, let me first clarify the position I 
hold. My position is that from the first person perspective the images 
that come to us via our imagination can at times possess the same 
sorts of qualities as the percepts that come to us via our senses. 1 9 
An imagined image can be just as forceful and vivacious as a per-
cept and sometimes a percept can lack these qualities in the way 
that images do. 2 0 Thus, percepts and images aren't intrinsically dif-
ferent from each other from the first person perspective. That said, 
they are intrinsically different from a third person perspective. The 
causal processes that produce an image are different from the causal 
processes that produce a percept; one involves the conscious will, 
the other does not. Moreover, though from a first person perspective 
there is no intrinsic difference between these sorts of mental states, 
As I see it, our intentions define the parameters under which we are to 
query the image under consideration. That is, upon calling forth an image, 
I must ask whether, if this image's origin were unknown to me, I would be 
justified in taking that image to be a veridical perception o f that which I had 
intended to imagine, viz., p. If I would be, then I am justified in taking that 
image to be of p. And I am so, even if that image could under different param-
eters be taken to be of something other than p. See Tidman, ( 1 9 9 4 ) : 301 and 
Rebecca Hanrahan, "Epistemology and Possibility," Dialogue, vol. XLIV, no. 4, 
Fall 2 0 0 5 . 
1 9 Shoemaker distinguishes two different senses behind the notion of the 
'first person point of view.' My notion is most akin to the first. That is, when 
I speak of the first person perspective, I speak of "some aspect of the life of a 
person as it might be experienced by that person" as opposed to speaking of 
"oneself doing or undergoing such and such" from the inside. See Sydney Shoe-
maker, "The First Person Perspective," The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical 
Debates, edited by N. Block et. al. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998) : 511. 
2 0 S e e footnote 15. 
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in general percepts do possess higher degrees of force, vivacity, and 
determination than imagined images. 
Note that, historically, the position I am offering here—that from 
the first person perspective our imagined images aren't intrinsically 
different from our percepts and hence can at time possess the same 
qualities as our percepts—is the standard empiricist position. Note as 
well that this position is common within the contemporary literature 
on the imagination.21 Some may balk at the relationship being drawn 
here between our imagination and perception. But at times we have 
all been confused about the origin of the image before our mind's 
eye. We have wondered if we are really seeing what we are seeing or 
if instead we are just imagining, or are subject to some trick of light. 
Some argue that such confusions aren't even all that uncommon. As 
William Lycan says, "[pjutting anomalies down to sensory delusion, 
lapse of memory, or faulty computation is both easier and more 
prevalent than might be thought." 2 2 But if we accept that we can be 
confused in this way, we also have to accept that such confusions are 
dependent on the fact that we can at times have images come to us 
via our imagination or via some optical illusion that possess the same 
qualities as those we have taken to be veridical. 
Moreover, the claim that there is no one property or sets of prop-
erties available from the first person perspective that determinately 
2 1 Colin McGinn states that there is one "non-negotiable fact about images: 
. . . they bear a phenomenological resemblance to percepts." He further argues 
that "maybe images are typically more indeterminate than percepts, but both 
seem to admit of some indeterminacy; if so, there is no ground for a sharp dis-
tinction here." (Colin McGinn, M'mdsight: Image, Dream, Meaning, (Cambridge, 
MA.: Harvard University Press, 2 0 0 0 ) : 41 and 25.) Similarly, Amy Kind argues 
that "perceiving and imagining are so experientially similar that the former is 
sometimes mistaken for the latter." (Amy Kind, "Putting the Image Back in 
Imagination," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. LXII , no 1 ( 2 0 0 1 ) , 
94 . ) Finally, Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft write, "The seeing and the 
visualizing have the same contents; the visualizing, moreover, has a visual char-
acter. We need invoke no more than this to explain our intuition that seeing 
and visualizing are similar, and facts about our limited capacity to discriminate 
between them." (Currie, Gregory and Ian Ravenscroft, Recreative Minds (Clar-
endon Press: Oxford, 2 0 0 2 ) : 28.) 
"William Lycan, "Occam's Razor," Judgment and Justification (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988) : 126. 
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distinguishes the one kind of sensory mental state from another is 
behind Descartes's dream argument and skepticism in general. Skep-
ticism arises precisely because there is no intrinsic mark or 'crite-
rion' that from the first person perspective indicates the source of 
our sensorial mental states. Thus, to reject my position is to render 
skepticism a non-problem. I don't think we want to solve skepticism 
so easily. Thus, we have to accept that our imagined images aren't 
intrinsically different from our percepts and hence can from the first 
person perspective share the same qualities.2 3 
So, now we can see how we can in some instances justify our tak-
ing the images we call forth to be images of p, despite the fact that 
these images are indeterminate. We are so justified if, upon ignor-
ing the fact that we willed these images, we could account for them 
as veridical perceptions given our best explanation. Thus, I have 
addressed the problem of indeterminacy. I have also clarified the 
ways in which percepts and images are alike from a first person per-
spective. But I haven't yet explained how conceivability can provide 
us with a guide to possibility, nor have I addressed the problem of 
incompleteness. To accomplish these tasks, we need to consider in 
more detail inferences to our best explanation. 
Conceivability as a Guide to Possibility 
Return to the airport. My belief that it was my father standing 
at the security gate was justified because via my best explanation I 
2 3 It could be argued that to preserve skepticism as a problem, we need 
only acknowledge that that there are no intrinsic differences between our hal-
lucinations and our percepts. And we can hold this position, while contending 
that our imagined images are intrinsically different from our percepts. This is 
correct . Note, though, that those who hold this position are conceding that the 
products of our imagination can possess all the same qualities as our percepts, 
but only when those images are produced not via the act of our conscious will. 
But why think that one's conscious will necessarily renders an imagined image 
less forceful and less vivacious than an imagined image brought forth without 
the conscious will being involved? I see no reason to answer this question in the 
affirmative. Thus, I don't yet see a reason to endorse this position over mine. 
That is, I don't yet see a reason to think that from a first person perspective 
there is an intrinsic difference between a percept and an imaged image brought 
forth willingly or unwillingly. 
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could tell a story about my perceptions that had my father jumping 
on a plane for a surprise visit. Notice that a coupling has occurred 
between the sensory and conceptual. It was my perceptions in com-
bination with the story I told about these perceptions that did the 
justifying here. 
A similar kind of coupling has also occurred with the imagina-
tion. Because of the problem of indeterminacy, I can't conclude 
that I have imagined p just by considering the images I conjure up. 
Instead, within the confines of my best explanation and while ignor-
ing the fact that I called forth these images, I must be able to offer 
an account of or story about these images that justifies my taking 
them to be veridical perceptions of p. If I can tell such a story, then 
I am justified in concluding that I have imagined p. Again, it is these 
images in combination with the stories I tell about them that does 
the justifying. 
Thus, we are no longer employing these two methods of conceiv-
ing separately. Rather, we are employing them together to negoti-
ate the problem of indeterminacy.24 Given this, it isn't enough to 
2 4 My theory of the imagination is similar to Peacocke's. Both Peacocke and 
I hold that while the images we call forth are integral to determining the con-
tent of our imagination, they alone don't determine this content. I argue that 
this content is also determined by the stories we tell about these images. Pea-
cocke similarly argues that this content is determined by our "S-imaginings." 
(Peacocke, ( 1 9 8 5 ) : 2 5 ) To S-imagine is to set forth a condition on the world 
that is being imagined. So, for example, to imagine a suitcase behind which a 
cat is completely obscured, one must call forth an image of a suitcase and then 
S-imagine that there is a cat behind it. 
I take myself as extending Peacocke's theory. Peacocke places only one 
limitation on what we can S-imagine. While multiple S-imaginings can apply to 
any one instance of our imagining something, Peacocke holds these multiple 
S-imaginings can't contradict each other. So, I can't S-imagine that there is a 
cat behind this suitcase and also S-imagine that there isn't a cat so hidden. But 
I contend that there needs to be other limitations placed on our S-imaginings. 
For as it stands now, our S-imaginings aren't confined by the images we call 
forth. So, I can call forth an image of a table with a round top and S-imagine 
that this tabletop also has the properties of a square. Now, maybe round-square 
tables can be imagined, but this is clearly a cheat. 
Peacocke is skeptical about the imagination's ability to solve philosophi-
cally complex problems. But he does not dismiss the imagination as a guide to 
possibility. Unfortunately, he doesn't explain the conditions under which the 
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determine whether either of these methods by themselves provides 
us with a guide to p's possibility. We must instead look at both of 
these methods and see whether or not together they provide us with 
a guide. 
Let's consider a simple case. I wonder whether it is possible for 
my dog, Seamus, to escape his pen. He hasn't yet, but could he? In 
response to this question, while looking out into his pen I conjure up 
images that are relatively forceful and vivacious. These images are of 
a dog that looks like Seamus digging a mighty hole and running free. 
Along with these images, I tell a story within the confines of my best 
explanation that would justify my taking these images to be veridi-
cal perceptions (if these images had come to me in such a way that I 
didn't know their origins). In this story, I explain how, given that the 
top soil around my house is both very thick and very loose, Seamus is 
able to dig a hole deep enough for him to crawl out under the fence 
and hence attain his freedom. 
Let's assume that up until the point at which I imagined Seamus, 
there was a possible world where my epistemic twin resided. Our 
epistemic twins are those individuals that exist in some possible world 
who share those first person epistemic properties and states that are 
relevant to our beliefs and our justificatory practices. From the first 
person perspective, they believe what we believe, experience what 
we experience, and reason as we do in the actual world. 2 5 Of course, 
in particular instances, two twins may be similar in other ways, but 
not as a direct consequence of their being epistemic twins. 2 6 
imagination can fulfill this role. This is what I am trying to do here. To work 
with Peacocke's terminology, I am arguing that the imagination can in some 
cases provide us with a guide, if the purpose of our S-imaginings is to offer an 
account of the images we call forth within the confines of our best explanation. 
" S e e footnote 19. 
2 6 Epistemic twins are different both from Kripke's epistemic counterparts 
and Putnam's twins. For Kripke, an epistemic counterpart is an individual that 
exists in a possible world. This individual possesses many of the traits that are 
used in the actual world to identify a particular person ( R ) as R. But yet this 
individual is not in fact R. By contrast, epistemic twins enjoy the same first per-
son epistemic properties and states, but they need not share any other traits. 
A twin on Putnam's Twin Earth, like an epistemic twin, will share all the same 
psychological states as her doppelganger in the actual world, but, unlike epis-
temic twins, Putnam's twins must also be "molecule for molecule identical." 
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Thus, up until the point at which I imagined Seamus, my epis-
temic twin, let's call her Rebecca, enjoyed the same first-person 
epistemic properties that I enjoyed. Let's further assume that a dif-
ference emerges between Rebecca and me with respect to these 
images of Seamus. Specifically, let's assume that while I consciously 
intended to imagine Seamus, Rebecca formed no such conscious 
intention. Instead, these images came to Rebecca unbidden. Thus, 
maybe Rebecca unconsciously called forth these images of Seamus, 
maybe she veridically perceived Seamus, or maybe instead she was a 
victim of an optical anomaly. 
Very little has been specified about the metaphysical make 
up of Rebecca or Rebecca's world. I have assumed that Rebecca's 
world is a possible world and I have assumed that in this possible 
world images of Seamus's escape have come to Rebecca without 
her engaging her conscious will. But nothing else has been specified 
about Rebecca or her world. Clearly, there are many questions to 
be asked here about these assumptions. But let's put these questions 
aside to see what follows. 
What should be obvious is that Rebecca is justified in believ-
ing that Seamus has escaped his pen. To explain, at the point at 
which these images of Seamus came to Rebecca and me, Rebecca 
should still be considered my epistemic twin for all intents and pur-
poses. For at this point, Rebecca differs from me epistemically in 
only one way. My images of Seamus were accompanied by my con-
sciously willing myself to have these images, while Rebecca's images 
were not so accompanied. But in every other way, her introspectible 
experiences of these images were like mine. They had the same con-
tent and they were as forceful and vivacious as my own. Moreover, 
the fact that Rebecca's images were not accompanied by a conscious 
intention to imagine would not have caused her to modify either 
her best explanation or how she employed her best explanation. 2 7 
Thus, she still employs her (and hence my) best explanation just as I 
Putnam, Hillary, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981): 18. 
2 7 1 know that Rebecca would not here modify her best explanation because 
up until this point Rebecca and I were in fact epistemic twins. Thus, I know 
the conditions under which she would modify her best explanation and these 
conditions have not been met here. 
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would employ it. Finally, in virtually every respect, her belief system 
is isomorphic with mine. To an overwhelming extent, we two share 
the same beliefs and we gather, sort, and combine these beliefs in the 
same ways. 
Given that Rebecca should still be considered my epistemic twin, 
the conditions under which she is justified in taking an image to be a 
veridical perception are the same for her as for me. I am justified in 
taking an image to be a veridical perception if it is sufficiently force-
ful and vivacious, and if it is not accompanied by the conscious inten-
tion to imagine. In addition, I must also be able to account for that 
image as a veridical perception given my best explanation. Above, it 
has already been established that Rebecca's images of Seamus pos-
sess all of the relevant properties. They were sufficiently forceful and 
vivacious, and (unlike my images of Seamus) they weren't accom-
panied by the conscious intention to imagine. Moreover, given that 
Rebecca and I still employ the same best explanation, she (like me) 
can account for these images as veridical perceptions. Her story (like 
mine) involves loose dirt and deep topsoil. Thus, Rebecca is justi-
fied in taking these images to be veridical perceptions of Seamus's 
escape. This means that there is a possible world in which my epis-
temic twin is justified in believing that Seamus has escaped his pen. 
Unfortunately, the mere fact that Rebecca is justified in believ-
ing that Seamus has escaped doesn't alone justify my belief that it is 
possible for Seamus to escape. For me to be so justified, I need some 
reason to base my beliefs on Rebecca's. Specifically, I need to be able 
to consider Rebecca a reliable witness with respect to the goings on 
in and around her. To be a reliable witness, first, she must have rea-
soned well when forming her beliefs about Seamus. And second, she 
must not be epistemically impaired. For example, I must not suspect 
that Rebecca regularly ingests psycho-tropic drugs. For if she did, I 
couldn't trust that her perceptions reflected what was actually in her 
world. 
I can't help but think that Rebecca has reasoned well here. To 
think otherwise, I would have to conclude that she reasoned differ-
ently from the way I would have reasoned if I were in her situation. 
And I would have to conclude that she reasoned poorly in this situ-
ation. But Rebecca employs my best explanation as I employ it. She 
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can't reason differently from me. And I certainly won't ever judge 
her to be reasoning poorly, since she reasons as I do. Thus, in my 
estimation, there is no way that she could have failed to satisfy this 
first condition. 
What then of the second condition? Do I have any reason to 
believe that Rebecca was epistemically impaired at the time at which 
these images of Seamus came to her? Again, Rebecca is for all intents 
and purposes my epistemic twin. My experiences are, for the most 
part, her experiences. Thus, if I believe myself to be epistemically 
impaired, I have reason to believe that Rebecca is epistemically 
impaired as well. But I have no such reason. My vision is 20/20. And 
neither shadow nor direct sun was distorting or impairing my vision 
at the time in question. In addition, as far as I know, there are no and 
there were no holographs in my backyard. Finally and more impor-
tantly, I didn't consume any mind altering substances prior to these 
images of Seamus coming to me. Thus, because I suffered no impair-
ments, I have no reason to believe that Rebecca's epistemic abilities 
were impaired. 
But doesn't the fact that I imagined Seamus's escape give me 
reason to believe that, unbeknownst to Rebecca, she was imagin-
ing as well? If it does, then I must consider Rebecca to be epistemi-
cally impaired. She must have suffered from some sort of hallucina-
tion. In response to this, note that I know that I imagined Seamus's 
escape largely because I consciously intended to imagine his escape. 
But Rebecca formed no such conscious intention. Thus, what jus-
tifies my conclusion that I was imagining wasn't true of Rebecca. 
Moreover, the fact that Rebecca formed no such conscious intention 
doesn't mean that this intention was formed unconsciously. It might 
have been; but as I said before, we don't know how and why these 
images came to Rebecca. Thus, nothing justifies the conclusion that 
Rebecca imagined here. 2 8 
2 8 Some might argue that what justifies this conclusion is the fact that 
Rebecca's world is seemingly so similar to my world. This similarity, coupled 
with the fact that I imagined this escape, supposedly gives me reason to believe 
that Rebecca also imagined this escape. Putting aside the question as to how 
similar Rebecca's world is to my world, what we do know about how Rebecca's 
world differs from mine precludes the success of this argument. Rebecca's 
images (unlike mine) weren't accompanied by the conscious intention to imag-
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Given this, I can conclude that in this situation Rebecca has satis-
fied the two conditions associated with being considered a reliable 
witness. I have every reason to believe that she has reasoned well 
and no reason to think that she was epistemically impaired. Thus, 
because Rebecca is in my estimation a reliable witness, I am justified 
in basing my beliefs on her beliefs. 
Some won't be satisfied with this argument, claiming that 
in order to establish Rebecca's reliability, I have to do more than 
merely satisfy these two conditions. I must as well uncover some 
reason to think that Rebecca's beliefs are true. For her beliefs could 
all be false and if they are, then surely I shouldn't base my beliefs on 
hers. But keep in mind that Rebecca is my epistemic twin. In every 
way but one, she has the same experiences, beliefs, and justificatory 
practices as I do. Now, because Rebecca is my epistemic twin, as far 
as I am concerned Rebecca's reliability and my reliability rise and fall 
together. Thus, if I have reason to doubt Rebecca's reliability, I will 
equally have reason to doubt my reliability. So, for me to entertain 
the possibility that Rebecca's beliefs are all reasonable but false, I 
must also entertain the possibility that my beliefs are reasonable but 
false. Moreover, to dismiss this possibility, I will have to establish that 
I am somehow immune from skepticism. In other words, I will have 
to solve the problem of skepticism. But surely I can't be required to 
do that here. 
Putting this in another way, those who worry about Rebecca's 
reliability never raise questions in regards to my reliability and 
instead accept it as a given. But what justifies them in limiting their 
skeptical concerns to Rebecca? How is it that these concerns arise 
only in this possible world but not in the actual world? The fact is 
once we play the skeptical card, it can be played over and over again, 
such that any epistemological question of concern here will have to 
be put aside to await skepticism's resolution. Thus, we have a choice. 
Either we assume that I am reliable and concede that Rebecca, for 
the reasons I offer, is reliable as well, and then proceed to consider 
the viability of my modal epistemology. Or, by raising the specter 
ine. On my and hence Rebecca's best explanation, images that aren't so accom-
panied are typically (though not always) deemed veridical. Thus, this argument 
from similarity doesn't go through. 
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of skepticism, we question both Rebecca's reliability and my own, 
abandon the study of modal epistemology altogether, and turn to the 
problem of skepticism. Other epistemologists have chosen the first 
option and it is the choice I make as well. 
So, let us concede that I am not required to solve the problem of 
skepticism and that hence Rebecca (like myself) is to be considered 
reliable. Given this, the fact that Rebecca is justified in believing that 
Seamus has escaped justifies my belief that in Rebecca's world Sea-
mus has escaped. Thus, I am justified in believing that there is a pos-
sible world in which my dog has escaped his pen. So, if the assump-
tion that began this example is acceptable, we have here an instance 
of my justifying my belief in what is possible based on the images I 
have called forth and on the story I have told. But is this assumption 
acceptable? 
I assumed above that there is a possible world in which images of 
Seamus's escape have come to Rebecca without their being accom-
panied by her conscious intention to imagine. I have made no other 
assumptions about this world. Moreover, this assumption doesn't log-
ically imply that in this world Seamus really did escape his pen. For 
again, this assumption doesn't say much of anything about the meta-
physical constitution of Rebecca or her world. In fact, this assump-
tion is compatible with Rebecca having unconsciously imagined 
Seamus, with her having veridically perceived Seamus, and with her 
being the subject of an optical illusion. Thus, I can't be charged with 
begging the question. But, even so, do I have any reason to believe 
that such images have come to Rebecca unbidden? 
Images of various kinds come to me without my conscious will 
being involved. This is true not only of my perceptions and the opti-
cal illusions I suffer from but of my imaginings as well. I accidentally 
fall into most of my daydreams while I am steadfastly intending to do 
my work. And, of course, given that Rebecca is my epistemic twin, 
the same must be true of her. Thus, the assumption that that these 
images have come to Rebecca without her forming any conscious 
intention seems perfectly acceptable. 
Moreover, any sensory experience we conjure up via our imagina-
tion is one that could have come to us in some way or other through 
a pathway associated with our sensory faculties. For what we imag-
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ine is constructed out of what we have at some point perceived. So 
it stands to reason that those sensory experiences produced by the 
imagination could have been produced via the workings (standard 
or otherwise) of our sensory systems. Thus, the fact that I just imag-
ined Seamus's escape means that there is a possible world in which 
Rebecca has either veridically or non-veridically perceived Seamus's 
escaped. And, of course, if an image is a product of our perception 
(whether veridical or not), then it has not been consciously willed. 
Thus, in this possible world Rebecca has had images of Seamus's 
escape come to her without her conscious will being involved. 
Note that above I am using my knowledge of what is possible 
to justify my main assumption. I know that it is possible for images 
of various kinds to come to me without my consciously intending 
anything. I know as well that what we can imagine we could have 
perceived. Thus, I see no problem in concluding that these images of 
Seamus came to Rebecca without being accompanied by a conscious 
intention to imagine. But even so, I can't be charged with begging 
the question. For nothing above implies that it is possible for Seamus 
to escape. To see this, it is important to note that I am not employing 
'perceive' as a success verb. I am not assuming that if Rebecca per-
ceived Seamus's escape, in her world he did in fact escape. Instead 
these perceptions could be the product of an optical anomaly and 
hence not represent any fact about her world. 
In the end, there is nothing illegitimate about my using the beliefs 
I do have about what is possible to justify other beliefs just so long 
as I beg no questions. Admittedly, a complete modal epistemology 
would explain how I came to know about these other possibilities. 
And, as I have suggested, some of this evidence comes directly from 
our own (actual) experiences. But my goal at this time isn't to set 
forth a complete modal epistemology. It is only to offer an account 
of how in some cases conceivability can provide us with a guide to 
possibility and this I have done. 2 9 
Thus, to summarize, it is the coupling of our abilities to conjure 
up images with our abilities to tell certain kinds of stories about these 
images that enables us in some cases both to negotiate the problem 
2 9 For a fuller discussion of the relationship between imagination and per-
ceptions, See Hanrahan, 2007. 
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of indeterminacy and to use conceivability as a guide to possibility. 
Say that I can conjure up images of something that looks like p. Say 
that I can also tell a story within the confines of my best explanation 
that would justify my taking these images to be veridical perceptions 
of p if I ignore the fact that I consciously willed these images. Well, 
then not only can I conclude that I have imagined p here, but I can 
also justify my belief that p is possible.3 0 
Obviously, I can't justify all of my beliefs in regards to what is pos-
sible via this epistemology. Consider again the example of Seamus. 
I imagined Seamus's escape as I was looking out into my backyard 
where his pen is. What if instead I had imagined his escape while I 
was doing my shopping? In such a case as this, if these images had 
come unbidden to my epistemic twin while she believed herself to 
be shopping, she would not be justified in taking them to be verid-
ical. Instead her best explanation (like mine) would demand that 
3 0 Shoemaker has a view similar to mine in so far as he holds that if we can 
imagine justifiably believing that p, this provides us with reason for thinking 
that p is possible. H e further argues that though the imagination can provide 
us with a guide to possibility, we need to be careful how we imagine p. P isn't 
to be imagined merely from the first person perspective; it is also to be imag-
ined from the third person perspective. For often when p is imagined from this 
perspective, it is revealed that what has been imagined from both perspectives 
begs the question. 
But in terms of my modal epistemology, what exactly does it mean to imag-
ine from the third person perspective? Return to the example of Seamus. Do I 
need to imagine from the outside a scenario in which Rebecca watches Seamus 
escape? If I do, then Shoemaker is right. I have begged the question here. I 
could only take myself to have imagined this if I assume that it is possible for 
Seamus to escape. But isn't the requirement to imagine such a scenario tanta-
mount to denying the role of the reliable witness? This requirement basically 
demands that I rely on Rebecca's reports only if what she has witnessed is in 
some sense witnessed by another. But this can't be right; either we rely on wit-
nesses or we don't, and if we do, we need not witness what they witness. 
Alternatively, it could be that what needs to be imagined here is Rebecca's 
reliability being evaluated from a third person, objective perspective. I take 
Rebecca to be reliable but can I imagine others doing so? To this, note again 
that Rebecca is my epistemic twin. Thus, I would have reason to think that 
others would doubt Rebecca's reliability only if I have reason to think that they 
would doubt mine. I have no such reason, so this imaginative exercise does not 
undermine my conclusion that Rebecca is reliable. Hence, I can base my belief 
in the possibility of Seamus's escape on Rebecca's beliefs. 
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she ascribe these images to an overactive imagination. Thus, at that 
moment while in the grocery story I couldn't via the above argument 
justify my belief that Seamus's escape was a possibility. But, via this 
epistemology, I could justify my belief that it was possible for the 
store to have run out of 1% milk or my belief that it was possible for 
there to be a sale on Hershey's Quik. 
We see, then, that via this method we are only able to justify 
those modal beliefs that refer to variations in our immediate percep-
tual surroundings. Thus, this method as it stands now is limited. But 
keep in mind that at this time, we have no viable modal epistemol-
ogy of any kind whatsoever. The only contenders out there—modal 
intuitionism and set-constructionism—suffer from deadly flaws. 3 1 So, 
even though this modal epistemology is limited, it does represent 
serious progress. Also keep in mind my goals for this paper. I wanted 
to construct a modal epistemology that could explain our everyday 
uses of conceivability as a guide to possibility. I wanted to explain 
why, for example, I was justified slowing down as a consequence of 
my imagining a police car's flashing blue lights in my rear view mir-
ror. Via an argument similar to the one presented above, I can now 
do just that. 
Counterexamples and Incompleteness 
So, my modal epistemology as it stands can't be used to justify all 
of our modal beliefs. This, in and of itself, isn't a reason to reject my 
epistemology. But might there be such a reason? To close this paper, 
I want to consider two counterexamples to my theory before return-
ing to the problem of incompleteness. 
First, it seems as if my theory is open to some standard counter-
examples brought against any modal epistemology. For example, I 
can imagine turning on the TV and being informed by the host of 
some morning news program that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. A 
reporter explains that astronomers have discovered an astronomi-
cal body that appears and disappears in the night sky about every 
1,000 years. An astronomer then comes on the telly and notes that 
the last time this body appeared was during antiquity and she fur-
3 1 See Hanrahan, 2007. 
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ther explains that where it appeared in the night sky back then was 
approximately where Venus would appear if you were looking at the 
sky from the Mediterranean. Hesperus is not Venus, this scientist 
concludes; hence Hesperus is not Phosphorus. 
Now the fact is, I learn a fair amount about my world via the 
news. Thus, if such reports can justify my beliefs about my world, 
they must also justify my twin in her beliefs about her world. So, my 
twin is seemingly justified in believing that Hesperus is not Phospho-
rus. Thus, given my modal epistemology, I am justified in believing 
that it is possible that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. But, of course, 
this is in fact an impossibility. So, here we seemingly have a counter-
example to my theory. 
But this example presents no challenge to my theory. To see this, 
consider that there are in fact two ways one could construe the sce-
nario described above by the imagined reporters and scientists. On 
one hand, suppose 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' rigidly designate 
Venus. Then the proposition "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is necessar-
ily true. Now, if this proposition is necessarily true, and I and hence 
my twin are aware of this fact, then reason demands that we (my twin 
and myself) take this scenario not to confirm the proposition that 
"Hesperus is not Phosphorus," which, as my twin and I both know, 
describes an impossibility. Rather, reason demands that we take this 
scenario to confirm the possible truth that "At different times peo-
ple have used the term 'Hesperus' to designate something other than 
Venus." But such a conclusion does not challenge the viability of my 
theory. On the other hand, these terms could be used in such a way 
that they don't rigidly designate Venus. And in fact this is how these 
terms are being used above. After all, it gets to be a counterexample 
only in virtue of the fact that in that scenario Hesperus is not Venus. 
But then there is no necessary truth at issue here such that this sce-
nario would allow me to confirm an impossibility. Thus, either way 
of taking this scenario poses no threat to my theory. 3 2 
1 2 It is true that my theory is not designed to test claims concerning a poste-
riori identities. After all, it is built on our accounting for our imagined experi-
ences as veridical perceptions via inferences to our best explanations. But the 
testing of such claims has dominated the discussion of modal epistemology, 
especially given how this discussion has played out in the context of the mind/ 
body debate. As a consequence, a kind of myopia has been imposed upon us 
Problems for a Modal Epistemology 51 
Let's now to turn to the second counterexample to my theory. I 
solve the problem of indeterminacy via inferences to the best expla-
nation. I argue that I am justified in taking an image to be of p despite 
the fact that that image is indeterminate if (upon ignoring the fact 
that I formed the conscious intention to imagine) I could give an 
account of that image via my best explanation that would justify my 
taking it to be veridical perception of p. But this solution to the inde-
terminacy problem leads to certain counter-intuitive conclusions. 
Say I want to imagine my uncle mowing my lawn, instead of my 
father. An image appears before my mind's eye of a man who looks 
like my uncle. As we know, this image also resembles my father. 
Using the procedure described above, I am not justified in taking 
this image to be of my uncle. Rather, I am only justified in taking it 
to be of my father. Hence, it seems I can't imagine my uncle mow-
ing my lawn. But this runs counter to our intuitions: of course I can 
imagine either my father or my uncle mowing my lawn. 
Keep in mind, though, that justification comes in degrees. Thus, 
my best explanation doesn't preclude me from concluding that this 
image is of my uncle ; I am just less justified in concluding that it is 
of my uncle as compared to my father. In terms of my modal episte-
mology, this means I have more reason to think that my father might 
mow my lawn than my uncle. But given my uncle's attitude towards 
lawn care and given where he lives, this conclusion conforms to my 
intuitions. 3 3 
Moreover, as I have said, it might be best to think of my solution 
to the indeterminacy problem as specific to the task of providing our-
selves with a guide to possibility, especially given this last objection. 
Thus, when we are imagining for the purpose of establishing p's modal 
status, the content of what has been imagined is to be determined via 
an inferences to our best explanation. When imagining for other pur-
poses, other requirements might be substituted; perhaps in some cases 
a mere appeal to our intentions in imagining is sufficient. So my general 
ability to imagine my uncle mowing my lawn isn't in jeopardy here. 
philosophers. By focusing solely on such claims, we have ignored the modal 
claims that are at the center of our everyday concerns. But these are exactly the 
sorts of claims that interest me and the ones my epistemology addresses well. 
" S e e footnote 12, 16, and 18 
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Let us finally turn to the problem of incompleteness. In my 
modal epistemology, it seems as if the images we call forth do noth-
ing more than prompt us to tell a story about p. These images seem-
ingly do nothing to justify our belief that p is possible. But if this is 
the case, then my modal epistemology is nothing new. In the end, 
I am just trying to justify my belief that p is possible by describing 
what I hope is a possible world in which p is true. Here though is 
where the problem of incompleteness and its solution come to the 
fore. If my modal epistemology is nothing new, if in other words I 
am merely trying to justify my belief that p is possible by describing a 
possible world in which p is true, then my modal epistemology must 
also suffer from the problem of incompleteness. Any description I 
give of a world will always be incomplete. Consequently, I can't be 
sure that this description when completed won't contain a contradic-
tion. Thus, I can't be justified in believing that p is possible based on 
this description alone. 
But, in telling such a story, I am not trying to describe a possible 
world. If I was, the above objection would hold. Rather, in telling this 
story, I am offering an explanation that justifies my taking the images 
I have called forth to be veridical perceptions of p. This explanation 
serves two purposes. First, it is because I can offer this explanation 
that I am justified in taking these images to be images of p. Second, 
my ability to offer this explanation is what justifies my belief that my 
epistemic twin has such an explanation at her disposal. And, as I have 
explained, because she too can offer this explanation, she is justified 
in believing that the images before her mind's eye are veridical per-
ceptions of p. Now, I can't help but consider my epistemic twin to be 
a reliable witness. Thus, the fact that she is so justified provides me 
with the necessary justification for my belief that p is possible. 
Consider how inferences to the best explanation work when 
what needs to be justified is a belief we hold about the actual world. 
In such a case, there is no requirement that our best explanations be 
complete. And, obviously, completeness isn't required with respect 
to the account we give of the perception in question. On both lev-
els, incompleteness is allowed for here. That is, despite these various 
incompletenesses, inferences to our best explanation are still taken 
to justify those beliefs which concern the actual world. And, impor-
tantly, these inferences are taken to justify these beliefs, even though 
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we recognize that these failures of completeness may hide unsolv-
able problems. Given that incompleteness does not trouble us when 
we employ inferences to the best explanation to justify our beliefs 
about the actual world, what reason do we have to let it trouble us 
when we use such inferences to justify our beliefs about possible 
worlds? I can identify none. Hence, the incompleteness objection 
has been addressed. 
Thus, we see here that the images we call forth and the stories we 
tell mutually reinforce each other and enable us to address the prob-
lems of incompleteness and indeterminacy. I can take the images I 
call forth as images of p (despite the fact these images are indetermi-
nate) if I can tell a story within the confines of my best explanation 
that justifies my taking these images to be veridical perceptions of p. 
I can take these same stories—in combination with these images—as 
providing me with a guide to p's possibility (despite the fact that 
these stories are incomplete) because these stories justify my twin's 
belief that these very same images are veridical perceptions. And it 
is in the end her justified belief about these images that justifies my 
belief that p is possible. 
Where then does this leave us? I have given an account of our 
more everyday uses of conceivability as a guide to possibility. I have 
also explained how in these cases we can solve the problems of inde-
terminacy and incompleteness. The task ahead is to figure out how 
this modal epistemology can be extended to justify more of our 
modal claims. But this task is best left for another paper. 3 4 
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